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AN OUTSIDER'S VIEW OF
COMMON LAW EVIDENCE
Roger C. Park*
EvrnENCE LAw ADRIFT. By Mirjan R.
Yale University Press. 1997. Pp. x, 158.

Damaska. New Haven:

$27.50.

If the discovery of truth be the end of the rules of evidence, and if sa
gacity consist in the adaptation of means to ends, it appeared to me
that, in the line of judicature, the sagacity displayed by the sages of law
was as much below the level of that displayed by an illiterate peasant or
mechanic in the bosom of his family, as, in the line of physical science,
the sagacity displayed by the peasant is to the sagacity displayed in the
same line by a Newton.1
There have been improvements since Bentham's jeremiad. But
Anglo-American evidence law is still puzzling. It rejects the
common-sense principle of free proof in favor of a grotesque jum
ble of technicalities. It has the breathtaking aspiration of regulating
inference by rule, causing it to exalt the foresight of remote
rulemakers over the wisdom of on-the-spot adjudicators. It departs
from tried-and-true practices of rational inquiry, as when it prohib
its courts from using categories of evidence that are freely used
both in everyday life and in the highest affairs of state. Sometimes
it seems to fear dim light more than deep darkness, as when it tells
judges to exclude hearsay even though the declarant cannot possi
bly give live testimony. At times it treats jurors as fools or bigots; at
others it venerates them as sages. To top it all, evidence law's great
est scholars have been among its strongest debunkers.
The institutional context in which evidence law operates partly
explains and partly justifies its approach to factfinding, as scholars
and judges have recognized. Many of them subscribe to Thayer's
view that evidence law is the "child of the jury system,"2 and that
exclusionary rules are needed to protect the jury against cognitive
shortcomings. Others have thought of evidence law mainly as the
child of the adversary system, viewing exclusionary rules as an at
tempt to achieve adversarial fairness - a game with even chances
* James Edgar Hervey Professor of Law, Hastings College of the Law, University of
California. A.B. 1964, J.D. 1969, Harvard. - Ed. I am grateful to my colleagues Richard S.
Frase and Gordon Van Kessel for helpful comments, and to Lynn Dean, Jim Day, and Shalini
Kedia for useful research assistance.
1. 1 JEREMY BENTiiAM, RATIONALE OF JUDICIAL EVIDENCE 5-6 (John S. Mill ed., 1827).
2. JAMES B. THAYER, A PRELIMINARY TREATISE ON EVIDENCE 266 (1898); cf. Charles T.
McCormick, Law and the Future: Evidence, 51 Nw. U. L. RE.v. 218, 224-25 (1956).
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- or to overcome or prevent adversarial distortions of truth.3 Still
others have explained its peculiarities as stemming from a desire to
purify courts of perjury and fabrication,4 or as an attempt to
achieve public acceptance of verdicts whatever their accuracy.5 Of
course, these theories can be combined.6
Mirjan Damaska's Evidence Law Adrift7 is a major addition to
the literature of explanation and critique. Damaska brings an out
sider's view - the perspective of one trained in Continental law to the question why Anglo-American factfinding is "so peculiar" (p.
2). He applies an "analytical and interpretive" approach, one that
mainly attempts to identify current justifications rather than histori
cal causes (p. 3). In doing so, he separates Anglo-American institu
tions that evolved as a single organism - such as the bifurcated
judge-jury system - into distinct elements. He then examines each
element, testing the current support that it gives to the edifice of
evidence law. Damaska's adroitness at isolating procedural fea
tures for separate analysis and at contrasting them with their Conti
nental counterparts helps common law scholars see their system in
a new light. He has written a book that every evidence scholar
should read, and that will be helpful to anyone interested in trials
and court procedure.
I.

THE THREE PILLARS

Damaska identifies three pillars of the common law of evidence:
the bifurcated judge-jury system, the temporal concentration of
proceedings, and the party-dominant adversary system. These
three features, present in a much stronger and more pervasive form
in Anglo-American systems than in Continental systems, are the
necessary support for many of the common law rules of evidence.
They are especially useful in explaining the otherwise puzzling in
trinsic rules (like the hearsay rule) that purportedly protect the
factfinder against misdecision. Damaska concludes that the Ameri
can law of evidence is eroding because these pillars are crumbling.
3. See, e.g., Edmund M. Morgan, The Jury and the Exclusionary Rules of Evidence,
4 U. Cm. L. RE.v. 247 (1937); Dale A. Nance, The Best Evidence Principle, 73 lowAL. RE.v.
227 (1988); cf. John H. Langbein, Historical Foundations of the Law of Evidence: A View
from the Ryder Sources, 96 CoLUM. L. RE.v. 1168 (1996).
4. See Edward J. Imwinkelried, The Worst Evidence Principle: The Best Hypothesis as to
the Logical Stmcture of Evidence Law, 46 U. MIAMI L. RE.v. 1069 (1992).
5. See Charles Nesson, The Evidence or the Event? On Judicial Proof and the
Acceptability of Verdicts, 98 HARV. L. RE.v. 1357, 1392 (1985). For a rebuttal, see Ronald J.
Allen, Rationality, Mythology, and the "Acceptability of Verdicts" Thesis, 66 B.U. L. RE.v. 541
(1986).
6. See, e.g., RUPERT CROSS & CoLIN TAPPER, CROSS ON EVIDENCE 1 (6th ed. 1985)

(combining adversarial and jury-trial rationales).
7. Mirjan Dama5ka is Sterling Professor of Law, Yale Law School.
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He agrees with the widespread view that jury trial is important,
but parts with convention in his analysis of the source of its impor
tance (pp. 26-57). He dissects jury trial in a way that invites us to
see the centrality of features that are often neglected or taken for
granted. He points out that the participation of lay factfinders is
not, in itself, an explanation for evidence rules (pp. 30-33). Ama
teurs would use heuristics and strategies from ordinary life, not
rules of evidence. Even the infusion of professional judges would
not create a need for rules of evidence, so long as judges and jurors
deliberated together, as in Continental environments in which lay
factfinders work with professionals (pp. 26-29).
Damaska gives little credit to the argument that jurors need to
be protected from their own cognitive shortcomings (pp. 29-33).
Though this concern helps explain the origin of evidence rules, in
order to justify them one must also show that the excluded classes
of information have a greater potential to skew lay than profes
sional judgment. There is no reason to believe jurors are less able
than judges to assess the weight of hearsay, or are more vulnerable
to the temptation of propensity inferences. Even for statistical and
scientific evidence, the average trial judge may be as baffled by
complexity as the average trial juror. At any rate, it is inconsistent
to claim that jurors have cognitive shortcomings and at the same
time expect them to follow complicated limiting instructions.
Damaska's debunking of this rationale of evidence law is often
persuasive, but occasionally he seems to yield to a debater's temp
tation to push a point too hard. True, there is little reason to think
that judges are better equipped to handle hearsay or character evi
dence than jurors. But to say that judges will be as baffled as jurors
by novel scientific evidence seems to deny the value of general edu
cation.8 At any rate, judges do believe that they know more than
jurors. Their conduct is undeniably influenced by the fact that ju
rors are neither lawyers nor experts. Were the other half of the
split tribunal a scientific panel or a fellow judge, the evidence
screener would be much less likely to create barriers. As might be
expected from an author convinced of the importance of neglected
features, Damaska's nod to more pedestrian explanations is a some
what grudging one (pp. 30-31, 128).
Having minimized the most obvious evidence-related feature of
jury trial, Damaska turns to other aspects that might escape notice
when thinking about reasons for evidence law. Consider the
cryptic, unexplained verdict, which is anathema on the Continent
8. Nor does use of limiting instructions necessarily show that judges have an inconsistent
attitude toward jurors. The fact that judges give jurors complicated limiting instructions does
not necessarily imply that they think them to be geniuses; limiting instructions could simply
be the least of the evils, better than excluding the evidence and better than saying nothing.
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but a nearly unavoidable feature of the Anglo-American jury trial.
It is not practical to ask lay jurors to write findings that justify their
decisions, but because of the absence of such findings, jury verdicts
suffer from a legitimacy deficit. The common law handles this defi
cit by allowing challenges to the evidentiary database. On the Con
tinent, there is less concern about the purity of the evidentiary input
because legitimacy is maintained by giving written reasons for ver
dicts. The law's yearning to legitimize inscrutable jury verdicts may
be "the single most neglected contribution of the jury to the ration
ale for evidentiary arrangements peculiar to the Anglo-American
procedural tradition" (p. 46).
But bifurcation itself has the most profound influence (pp. 4653). The splitting of the trial court into two bodies creates a seed
bed for rules excluding evidence. In a unitary tribunal, exclusion is
less practical. It is especially hard for a unitary court to enforce
rules of exclusion that aim at guarding against the trier's weak
nesses. The judges of a unitary court would have to exclude on
grounds that they themselves might be prejudiced. Moreover, ex
cluding is not the same thing as forgetting. For these reasons, bifur
cation provides "the institutional black velvet on which the jewels
of the common law's exclusionary doctrine can display their full po
tential and allure" (p. 52). Correspondingly, the lack of bifurcation
on the Continent, even in cases in which lay people participate in
factfinding, helps explain the absence of exclusionary rules.
After discussing the jury trial, Damaska turns to his second pil
iar, one that may not even occur to one schooled only in the com
mon law system - the concentrated day-in-court trial (pp. 58-73).
The English tradition of the concentrated trial, with parties bringing
evidence that had not previously been scrutinized to court, created
a need for evidence rules that would not otherwise have existed
(pp. 68-70). Evidentiary practices appropriate in concentrated trials
in which raw evidence is dumped on the table are not needed for
episodic trials. Elaborate, during-trial authentication formalities
are not needed if there is an opportunity to check authenticity be
forehand. A ban on hearsay is harder to defend if the opponent has
the opportunity to seek out the declarant for testimony in court, or
to seek out information about him if the declarant is not available.
Rules designed to prevent surprise or to abbreviate proceedings are
less necessary. The gap between the Anglo-American concentrated
trial and the episodic Continental trial is narrowing, and hence one
of the pillars of common law evidence is deteriorating (pp. 58-73,
129).
Damaska's final pillar (a giant in an unequal group) is the ad
versary system, defined as "a system of adjudication in which proce
dural action is controlled by the parties and the adjudicator remains
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essentially passive [and in which] litigants and their counsel decide
what facts shall be subject to proof" (p. 74). The parties investigate
the facts, organize them, and present them to the tribunal. Lawyers
coach witnesses, and they select experts tendentiously. Though the
vouching doctrine has been repudiated, participants still find it hard
to separate sources of proof from the party offering the proof (p.
76). Judges rarely call their own witnesses, and the system is un
comfortable with the turncoat witness. It is often unclear, for ex
ample, who is entitled to cross-examine a witness who wavers
between sides.
In contrast, on the Continent, evidence is assembled by judges
and other officials (p. 77). Damaska reports that though contacts
between counsel and witnesses are increasing, they are still disfa
vored; if revealed, lawyer contact diminishes the witness's credibil
ity (p. 77). Expert witnesses are appointed by the court as assistants
to the judge rather than as true witnesses; in fact, they are allowed
to pose questions to ordinary witnesses. The fission of evidence
presentation into plaintiff's and defendant's cases is unknown or
nearly so (p. 78).
Damaska agrees with those who believe that the adversary sys
tem helps explain the disapproval of hearsay (pp. 79-80). The asso
ciation of evidence with parties makes hearsay problematic. With
bipolarization comes increased concern about fabrication. Its sup
posed cure, cross-examination, is "enveloped with clouds of eulogy,
almost apotheosized" (p. 79). It is easy to see an out-of-court de
clarant as the confederate of an enemy, unfairly kept from view and
insulated from the test of cross-examination. Moreover, the prac
tice is more important in a system in which a well-done cross
examination can diminish the credibility of almost any testimony.
Thus, "the common law's hostility toward hearsay is not predicated
on purely epistemic concerns: it also springs from principles of fair
ness that are applicable to a competitive fact-finding scheme" (p.
80). When the common lawyer's solicitude for adversarial fairness
does not stand in the way (for example, when the evidence is the
admission of a party), then hearsay is more freely received.
Damaska reports that, on the Continent, challenges to the accu
racy of witness testimony are focused and subdued, seldom escalat
ing into a broad attack on veracity. When hearsay is received,
lawyers are less likely to feel that they have been cheated or that an
enemy has unfairly been kept offstage and untested (p. 81).
In addition, there is a difference in the degree to which hearsay
is dangerous to truthfinding. In the adversary system, hearsay is
more dangerous because party competition does not always pro
duce the best evidence. For example, a party might prefer to
present hearsay in lieu of original testimony because the witness
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who would testify to the hearsay evidence has a more persuasive
demeanor, a higher social status, or a better sense of theater than
the out-of-court declarant. A rule excluding hearsay provides that
party with an incentive to find and call the original declarant (p.
85).
In an adversarial system, limits on heterodox expert testimony
are more necessary because parties would otherwise present ques
tionable experts for partisan advantage. Moreover, the rejection of
otherwise probative evidence can actually help to protect truthfind
ing if exclusion prevents adversarial misconduct. For example, an
exclusion for violation of a rule requiring pretrial disclosure of evi
dence may encourage fair disclosure in future cases. In addition,
rules excluding evidence are more likely to be invoked by the par
ties under an adversarial system because an objection is a complaint
about the behavior of the opponent, not about the behavior of the
body that will eventually make the decision on the merits (p. 86).
The adversarial system also enhances party control over the ap
plication of evidence rules (pp. 87-88). Sometimes a party has the
option of opening or closing a door to an opponent's evidence by
offering or forgoing evidence of its own. Parties can stipulate to
variations in evidence rules, or let them be modified by failing to
object to an opponent's evidence. Damaska observes that features
of party control that lawyers in Anglo-American systems take for
granted seem amazing to outsiders. Parties can stipulate, for exam
ple, that a polygraph test is admissible, even when the test would
otherwise be deemed insufficiently trustworthy. Because parties
control objections to evidence, the Anglo-American system is occa
sionally more receptive to hearsay than the Continental system. On
the Continent, in jurisdictions that prefer the use of original over
hearsay proof, even if the parties are content with hearsay, a judge
may require original proof. Ironically, then, Continental law is oc
casionally more strict in barring hearsay than the common law.
Damaska considers the extent to which Anglo-American parties
are permitted to agree to variances in rules of evidence to suit
themselves in particular cases to be a "striking - though un
remarked - idiosyncrasy of the common law fact-finding style" (p.
88).
In his discussion of the adversary system, Damaska reflects on
the effectiveness of the system for truthfinding (pp. 88-103), and on
what its uncertain regard for truth shows about the purposes of liti
gation (pp. 111-24). Readers may recognize echoes of his work in
the 1970s and 1980s in this portion of the book.9 With his usual
elegance, he compares the Anglo-American adversary system to
9. See MnuAN DAMA!lKA, THE FACES OF JUSTICE AND STATE AUTHORITY (1986); Mirjan
Damaska, Adversary System, in 1 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF CRIME AND JUSTICE 24 (Sanford
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Continental systems - or perhaps it would be more accurate to say
that he compares models or conceptually purified paradigms.
While he draws back from a firm conclusion, it is clear that he is
skeptical about claims that the adversary system promotes
truth:finding, and finds its departure from ordinary means of ra
tional inquiry disturbing (pp. 92-103). The fission into two distinct
cases cuts out investigation of other possibilities: "[A]s in a car
driving at night, two narrow beams continue to illuminate the world
presented to the adjudicator from the beginning until the end of
trial" (p. 92). The sequence of your-case/my-case, one-story-at-a
time is artificial. Narratives are disrupted by technical objections
and sidebars and by the question-and-answer method itself.
Although passivity has some virtues, active inquiry is a better and
more natural way to learn (pp. 96-97).
Damaska finds particularly troubling the role of biased, self
interested partisans in developing evidence (pp. 98-102). Partisan
interviews can plant false memories. Information sources may be
polluted in ways that cross-examination cannot cure. Witnesses, be
cause they are aligned with a party, begin to feel like members of a
team. They are coached by parties and, in the case of experts, paid
by them. Parties present evidence selectively. They want only wit
nesses who will help them and only want part of what the witnesses
know. Information that does not clearly help one or the other is
filtered out. Moreover, the idea that hearing two partisan accounts
helps the trier discover the truth only works where the contestants
have equal resources, a condition not often met.
Though Damaska disclaims any final conclusion about which
system produces better results, he would find it "unsurprising" if
"some version of the officially dominated fact-finding model is
found to be better suited for truth-discovery" (pp. 102-03). He
doubts that even common law trial lawyers feel that the adversary
system is best for discovering truth. The common law's embrace of
the adversary system shows how highly the common law values dis
pute resolution as the goal of all procedure. Even the criminal pro
cess is seen as an exercise in the settlement of disputes.10 This
ubiquitous dispute-resolving mission
erects the considerations of disputational fairness - such as the bal
ancing of advantages between the litigants - to the status of values
capable of interfering with the search for the truth. And it is the pri
macy of the conflict-resolving vision that explains why the competitive
fact-finding system appears acceptable - or even desirable - in

Kadish ed., 1983); Mirjan Damaska, Presentation of Evidence and Factfinding Precision, 123
U. PA. L. REv. 1083 {1975).
10. He reports that on the Continent, civil suits are seen as devoted to resolution of dis
putes, but criminal trials are venues for the realization of state policy about crime. Pp. 11320.
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Anglo-American countries, despite the departures it entails from or
dinary fact-finding practices. [p. 124]

In this excursus, Damaska seems temporarily insensitive to pos
sible virtues of the common law system. The common law's ro
mance with the adversary system may be based not only on a
dispute-resolution mentality, but also on a belief that it is a brake
on abuse of power.11 A nonadversarial, active-judge system has ob
vious advantages if one can take for granted that the legal environ
ment will come equipped with judges who are unbiased, hard
working, delicate with the liberties of others, incorruptible, and im
pervious to the wishes of influential friends. If one doubts those
assumptions, then the common law system could seem superior
even to those who value accurate verdicts. Damaska's analytical
method - disentangling the elements of the common law system
and viewing them separately - has many advantages, but it can
also obscure the synergy of some of the elements. The jury system
(a bifurcated court with lay factfinders chosen randomly for the oc
casion) works together with the adversary system in limiting the
power of officials; the strong role of the parties prevents the judges
from sabotaging the safeguard of ad hoc, amateur factfinding.12 If
citizens of common law countries see the combination as a safe
guard against oppression or corruption13 - whether they are right
or wrong - then Damaska's thesis that love of the adversary sys
tem reveals a preference for settlement above truth may need
qualification.
II.

CRACKS

IN THE

PILLARS

Having identified the three pillars, Damaska chronicles their de
cline (pp. 125-42). Several common law jurisdictions have virtually
eliminated the jury system (pp. 126-29). Even in its ultimate citadel
- criminal cases in the United States - its importance is declining
(p. 127). Jury trials are only a small proportion of the total cases in
the system. Their main function is to serve as a bargaining chip in
plea negotiations, because the defense can hold out the threat of
going to trial. With the decline of the jury trial, skills of lawyers will
atrophy, and the law of evidence will lose an argumentative justifi
cation. It will be harder to present evidence law as a necessary
11. In Adrift, DamaSka makes only a passing reference to "the classical liberal impulse to
keep the state at arm's length." P. 118. Elsewhere he has explored the link between the
adversary system and an ideology that fears state power. See Mirjan DamaSka, Structures of
Authority and Comparative Criminal Procedure, 84 YALE L.J. 480, 532-39 (1975).
12. In our grand jury proceedings we see an example of lay adjudication in the absence of
adversarial protections, and with rare exceptions the grand jurors are under the control of the
public official who presents evidence and guidance to them.
13. For a classic statement of this view, see Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 155-56
(1968).
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prophylactic against the foibles of lay reasoning (p. 128). There will
be less need to compensate for the unexplained nature of jury ver
dicts. Most importantly, without bifurcation it will simply be harder
to enforce rules of evidence because the trier of fact will also rule
on admissibility. Damaska concludes that the oldest pillar is "more
ornamental than functional" (p. 129).
Here I will pause for a caveat. I believe that Damaska is correct
in saying that the functional end of jury trial would profoundly
change the law of evidence. But for the American system, one may
question his empirical conclusion. It is true that, compared to the
total number of cases filed, the proportion of jury trials - or any
trials - has decreased compared to cases settled or plea bar
gained.14 That suggests a waning of influence, though one must re
member that the jury throws a long shadow over everything else.1s
Considered as a percentage of cases tried, however, the jury seems
to be holding its own. Federal jury trials have been a fairly constant
proportion of all trials in the last three decades, in criminal cases
comprising a majority of all trials.16 The jury trial also seems to be
holding on in state courts. Approximately eighty percent of tort
claims and sixty percent of criminal cases that go to trial in state
court are tried to a jury, and there are twice as many jury trials as
14. The percentage of federal criminal cases filed that went to trial was 14.9% in 1982, see
.ANNuAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS
in 1982 REPs. OF THE PRoc. OF THE JUD. CoNF. OF THE U.S. 310; it declined to 8.3% in 1996,
see JUDICIAL BUSINESS OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS: 1996 REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR, in
1996 REPS. OF THE PRoc. oF THE Juo. CoNF. OF THE U.S. 221 tbl.D-4 [hereinafter 1996
REPORT]. For a longer view, see Albert W. Alschuler & Andrew G. Deiss, A BriefHistory of
the Criminal Jury in the United States, 61 U. Cm. L. REv. 867, 921-28 (1994) (describing and
condemning the transition from trial to bargained pleas in the American criminal justice
system since the 18th century).
15. For an interesting account of the strong role that civil jury verdicts still play in a
system geared to settlement, see Samuel R. Gross & Kent D. Syverud, Don't Try: Civil Jury
Verdicts in a System Geared to Settlement, 44 UCLA L. REv. 1 (1996).
16. Damaska says that "[o]f those cases that are not disposed by bargained guilty pleas,
an increasing portion is decided by judges sitting alone." P. 127 (citing Stephen Schulhofer,
ls Plea Bargaining Inevitable?, 97 HARV. L. REv. 1037 (1984)). Since the publication of
Professor Schulhofer's article in 1984, however, jury trials have held their own as a propor
tion of total trials, at least in the federal courts. In 1984 federal jury trials were 43.1% of all
trials (56.3% of criminal trials); in 1996, the most recent year for which information is avail
able, the figures are 48.3% of all trials and 56.6% of criminal trials. ANNUAL REPORT OF TI-IE
DIRECTOR OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, in 1984 REPS. OF TI-IE
PROC. OF THE JUD. CoNF. OF THE U.S. 298-301 tbl.C-7; 1996 REPORT, supra note 14, at 171
tbl.C-7.
To take a more distant benchmark: In his well-known 1970 article on the declining need
for evidence rules in bench trials, Kenneth Culp Davis wrote that "[d]istrict courts in [1968]
completed 14,221 trials in civil and criminal cases, of which 7,278 were nonjury and 6,943
were jury trials." Kenneth Culp Davis, Hearsay in Nonjury Cases, 83 HARV. L. REv. 1362,
1363 (1970). For 1996, the most recent year for which data is available, the sentence would
read: "District courts completed 17,545 civil and criminal trials, of which 9,068 were nonjury
and 8,477 were jury trials." The absolute number of jury trials has increased since Davis
wrote, and the proportion has decreased only slightly (48.9% in 1968, 48.3% in 1996). See
1996 REPORT, supra, at 171 tbl.C-7.
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bench trials.17 Though jury trial seems anachronistic in certain
types of cases, it will die slowly if at all. It has the protection of its
constitutional status,18 of the public's love of its drama, and of its
continuing value in lending legitimacy to resolutions of otherwise
ineffable credibility con:flicts.19
Turning to the second pillar, temporal compression, Damaska
postulates severe decay on account of extensive pretrial proceed
ings and discovery (p. 129). Such pretrial practices make it less im
portant to check the authenticity of evidence (p. 130). Yet he
recognizes that pretrial discovery is used adversarially, and that
such phenomena as overproduction and concealment leave a
residual need for checking and filtering. Moreover, criminal discov
ery remains primitive in many jurisdictions. His second pillar seems
far less important than the others, both because it has less impact
even when ideal archetypes are fully contrasted, and because the
dimension and nature of the changes in it do not remove the need
for evidentiary barriers. Litigation is more spread out, but safe
guards are still needed so long as pretrial activity is adversarial.
Nevertheless, the expanded opportunity for notice before trial and
the practice of some courts in disposing of technical objections
before trial has had an impact on authentication rules and provides
opportunities for notice-based reform of rules such as the hearsay
rule.
Damaska believes that the third pillar - the adversary system
- is also cracking (pp. 135-42). He concedes that it still has strong
support, and that some features of contemporary litigation docket pressure, for example - actually shore up the common
law's dispute-resolution mentality and its proclivity to delegate evi
dence development to parties. But there is at least a potential for
reducing the role of parties. To begin with, he asks the reader to
consider how subtle changes in the lawyer-judge relationship in
bench trials weaken the adversarial climate. First, there is more in
teraction between trier and advocate. Judges, unlike jurors, can
communicate with lawyers during trial. When judges become di
rectly accountable for accurate factfinding, their sense of personal
responsibility causes them to intervene more actively than they
17. See Laird C. Kirkpatrick, Evidence Law in the Next Millennium, 49 HASTINGS LJ.
{forthcoming 1998) (citing BRIAN J. OSTROM & NEAL B. KAUDER, EXAMINING THE WoRK
OF STATE CoURTS, 1995: A NATIONAL PERSPECTIVE FROM THE COURT STATISTICS PROJECT
30 (National Center for State Courts ed., 1996); BUREAU OF JusTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEPT.
OF JUSTICE, FELONY SENTENCES IN STATE COURTS, 1992, at 10 tbl.10 {1995)).
18. See U.S. CONST. amend. VI, VII. The Seventh Amendment protects the right to jury'
trial in federal civil cases, while the Sixth Amendment guarantees the right in federal and
state criminal cases. See Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 151-56 (1968).
19.

See George Fisher, The Jury's Rise as Lie Detector,

107 YALE L.J. 575, 705-07 (1997).
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would when supervising jury trials.20 Lawyer-against-lawyer argu
ments are supplemented with arguments between the lawyers and
the increasingly active judge. Second, contests over evidentiary ob
jections become more tame. Lawyers know that the ultimate trier
will learn the substance of the evidence whether or not an objection
is sustained; in fact, attempts to keep out valuable evidence can
themselves annoy the judge. Moreover, pointless struggles over un
important evidence are less likely to occur in judge-only trials, be
cause exchanges between the judge and the lawyers make it easier
for lawyers to surmise what matters to the trier of fact. Overall,
when the roles of factfinding and of evidence-screening are united,
the judge's power is increased and that of the parties diminished,
and the adversarial climate becomes more subdued.
Damaska also postulates that increasing state activism will influ
ence the procedural framework (pp. 136-38). The strong role of the
parties in a common law trial is associated with the laissez-faire
state and its minimalist goals. With the rise of an activist state, with
its social policies and programs, litigation would be used to imple
ment state policy rather than merely to settle disputes.
When government has an activist agenda, even bilateral ar
rangements are seen as affecting social policy. Virtually all private
contracts can be significant in terms of some government policy,
such as protecting the environment, preventing abuse of market
power, or encouraging fair employment practices (p. 137). A firing
can be an act of discrimination or sexual harassment. "Adjudica
tion itself may tum into a governmental program [that] calls for a
strategic vision reaching beyond the particular case before the
court" (p. 137). Where externalities such as an impact on the envi
ronment are of concern, the court is less likely to want to be a pas
sive umpire and more likely to want to develop its own facts. Also,
where implementation of state policy is the goal, courts are less
willing to treat two clashing possibilities defined by the parties as
the full range of reality (pp. 136-37).
Here the reader may recognize echoes of Damaska's The Faces
of Justice and State Authority21 and may wonder whether the pros
pects for an expanding activist state in the United States are as firm
now as they were when that work was written. Damaska concedes
that pressure from this source may be temporarily dormant, and
recognizes that there are signs in many countries of transfer of au
thority away from the central state, a development that he charac
terizes as a "neomedieval movement" (p. 139 n.27). But he believes
20. P. 135. For observations, partly based on the Diplock trials, that reinforce this point,
see Sean Doran et al., Rethinking Adversariness in Nonjury Criminal Trials, 23 AM. J. CRIM.
L. 1, 26-30 {1995).
21.

MIRJ.Al'l

DAMA�KA, THE FACES OF JUSTICE AND STATE AUTHORITY 231-39 {1986).
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that increased state involvement is inevitable anyway. Technologi
cal advances mean that events such as ecological disasters are more
likely to affect large numbers of people. Strong economic pressures
exist for collective lawsuits. In multiparty cases, plaintiff-against
plaintiff and defendant-against-defendant disputes will undermine
the bipolar paradigm (p. 140). The growing complexity of factual
issues about markets or hazards "resists being fitted into the corset
of two partisan evidentiary cases" (p. 140). Investigative services of
government agencies are needed and there is an inclination to use
the results at trial.22
Damaska believes that these influences may weaken the adver
sary system, but he recognizes that this third pillar is still fairly ro
bust (p. 141). The system has habit and tradition behind it, and in
the United States it has a measure of constitutional protection.
These forces are bolstered by the needs of judges with clogged
dockets who welcome private procedural enterprise as a means of
reducing the number of trials. The goal of dispute resolution thus
remains important, perhaps still dominating the goal of accurate
policy implementation. Because a damn-the-facts, end-the-fight
mentality supports greater party control, the adversary system is
likely to be with us for a while longer.23
Despite the qualifications he noted along the way, Damaska
ends the heart of his book - his three pillars analysis - with a
fairly strong conclusion: that "[w]ith jury trials marginalized, proce
dural concentration abandoned, and the adversary system some
what weakened, the institutional environment appears to have
decayed that supplied distinctive features of common law evidence
with a strong argumentative rationale" (p. 142). Therefore, the
rules of evidence "face the danger of becoming antiquated period
pieces, intellectual curiosa confined to an oubliette in the castle of
justice" (p. 142).

III.

THE WHIRLWIND

In his Epilogue, Damaska looks at another change - the
"creeping scientization of factual inquiry" (p. 143) - and assesses
its impact on evidence law and on the three pillars thesis (pp. 14352). He notes that testimony derived immediately from sensory
perception has declined in importance, to be supplanted by expert
testimony, including testimony about the results of scientific testing.

22. P. 140. For example, agency reports are admitted under the public records exception
to the hearsay rule as expansively interpreted by the Supreme Court. P. 140 n.29.
23. Pp. 141-42. The rise of "managerial judging" in the civil context suggests a possibility
that does not sit comfortably with Damaska's linkage of party dominance to a dispute resolu
tion mentality
viz., the bossy, initiative-taking, inquisitorial judge whose goal is not policy
implementation but dispute resolution. Of course, the managerial judge usually does not get
involved until after considerable party activity.
-
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The trial system must more and more deal with information that
only experts can understand easily.
The "scientization of proof" (p. 145) puts additional strain on
the three pillars. The lay jury's understanding is challenged. It has
a harder time with scientific evidence than would an expert panel or
even a judge, who at least has the opportunity to acquire familiarity
through repetition. The use of experts makes it harder to have a
continuous proceeding that leads without interruption to a defini
tive climax. Complex information is hard to assimilate in day-in
court proceedings; a sequence with intervals would make more
sense. And the party-dominant adversary system is not a good way
of dealing with scientific information. Parties will be selective,
looking only for favorable information. Cues and strategies used in
ordinary life can lead the trier astray. Parties with weak cases may
find the most credible-looking experts. And jurors cannot test con
flicting scientific testimony by assessing how it fits with the rest of a
party's story. Establishing truth by examining consistency is diffi
cult because scientific evidence rarely fits into story-like narratives
(p. 146).
Moreover, the fission into two cases "bedevils" the presentation
of scientific data (p. 146). Experts on different sides usually cannot
be examined "back to back" (p. 146). And the use of oral testi
mony presented in response to questions may actually be inferior to
the study of written materials. In short, the common law proce
dural environment is not well suited for the effective and accurate
presentation of scientific information. Because the law follows the
prevailing "epistemological temper" (p. 147), there eventually will
be legal change to accommodate scientific inquiry.
Though Damaska believes that only the general direction of
change can be predicted, he ventures a few suggestions about the
form that change might take (pp. 147-52). He predicts the growth
of a diverse menu of trial mechanisms, both unitary and bifurcated.
The responsibilities of the lay jury will probably be reduced. Blue
ribbon juries may find acceptance. Judging will more often be dele
gated to special masters. Proceedings will become more episodic
and document-driven. Decisionmakers will be allowed to study evi
dentiary material beforehand. Party control will be less pervasive.
In the new age, the lawyer-dominated jury trial will no longer be
seen as the paradigm for which all evidence rules are designed. Ac
cordingly, there will be less emphasis on evidence screening. Wit
nesses will gain greater freedom to tell what they know. But
Damaska doubts that Continental systems will be adopted, because
of the absence of a civil service judiciary or neutral official investi
gators. There will be "indigenous remedies" for the illnesses of the
common law courts (pp. 151-52).
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Damaska predicts that Continental systems will also have
problems dealing with experts (pp. 151-52). He indicates that Con
tinental proceduralists are beginning to worry about the dominance
of court-appointed experts. Judges, who have difficulty compre
hending the arcane findings of some experts, may be seen as dele
gating decision.making powers to an outsider who lacks legitimacy.
Damaska believes that the tension between the impenetrability of
science and the adjudicator's postulated freedom to decide using
ordinary reasoning will cause great changes on the Continent. It
may mean that one of the main precepts of Continental evidence
law - the principle of free evaluation of evidence - will need to
be rethought.
Damaska believes that all justice systems will face great trans
formations, changes that could be as momentous as the changeover
from magical forms of proof at the end of the Middle Ages. And he
sees some advantages in the common law tradition that might help
it survive the expected storms with less disruption than Continental
systems. The common law's bifurcated court has created "habits of
fragmenting authority" (p. 152). Those habits might facilitate the
division of decision.making authority between scientific experts and
others. Even the much-criticized practice of partisan selection of
experts may lessen the stress of change. Because the common law
is accustomed to resolving battles of experts, its judges may not
yield so blindly to the authority of science as would judges who use
their own chosen experts. At any rate, "the cracking pillars of com
mon law evidence" will be repaired or replaced "by domestic ma
sons and by indigenous building material" (p. 152).
I have summarized Damaska's main themes. Bur of course all
summaries select and omit. The reader of the full book will find
much more than an elaboration of the points I have sketched. I
have concentrated on the Anglo-American system, passing over
many of his interesting and useful observations about Continental
law. Where I have noted features of Continental law, I have some
times omitted Damaska's qualifications; he recognizes that systems
are mixed and that features of adversarial practice appear on the
Continent. Moreover, I excluded as subsidiary some of Damaska's
most original and intriguing points. One example is his discussion
of how bifurcation cuts so deeply that it even influences the concept
of relevancy - causing common law thinkers to make what would
otherwise be a highly artificial distinction between the credibility of
the source of evidence and the probative value of evidence if credi
bility is assumed (pp. 56-57).
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CRITIQUE

I think that Damaska is mainly right about the pillars of com
mon law evidence. The jury system is obviously important, and its
decay would have strong consequences. Similarly, many of our evi
dence rules would make no sense in a nonadversarial system although as he recognizes, the adversary system is likely to be with
us for a long time to come.24 The Anglo-American concentration
of proceedings - the most slender of Damaska's three pillars probably also has some effect. Finally, science, the approaching
whirlwind discussed in his Epilogue, will shake the three pillars,
changing evidence law in the course of changing everything else.
Even if Damaska is mainly right, evidence teachers need not
fear that they will lose their jobs. Damaska's thesis applies mainly
to intrinsic rules of exclusion, those that seek to prevent misdeci
sion by the trier of fact. Changes in the three pillars will have less
effect on extrinsic exclusionary rules that pursue other goals. The
rules of privilege, which sometimes sweep more broadly on the
Continent than in the United States (pp. 12-13), are one example.
They are enforceable even in a unitary tribunal. Unless the party
seeking to pierce the privilege lays an affirmative foundation for
doing so, not even the evidence screener learns the privileged infor
mation.25 They are not founded on ideas of jury incompetence or
dependent on concentrated proceedings. Nor do they thrive only in
the adversary system
although, as Damaska points out, the in
volvement of lawyers with witnesses may in some situations make
the invocation of privilege more likely (p. 13 n.16). Rules based on
extrinsic policies have continued to flourish in America, most re
cently with the recognition of the therapist-patient privilege,26 the
expansion of the remedial measures rule,27 and the enhanced pro
tection given rape complainants against revelation of sexual
history.28
The shape of the intrinsic exclusionary rules, such as the rules
against hearsay and character evidence, will undoubtedly be af
fected by the forces that Damaska identifies. But as is always the
__:_

24. For an adept account that leaves one thinking that the adversary system is perhaps
too much alive in contemporary American criminal process, see Gordon Van Kessel,
Adversary Excesses in the American Criminal Trial, 67 NoTRE DAME L. REv. 403, 431-32
(1992).
See United States v. Zolin, 491 U.S. 554, 570-72 (1989).
26. See Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1 (1996).
27. See FED. R. Evm. 407 (as amended Dec. 1, 1997). The new rule makes it clear that

25.

the exclusionary provision applies in strict liability cases as well as negligence cases.
28. See FED. R. Evm. 412 (the "rape shield" rule). Though the rule is partly based on the
concept that juries may be prejudiced by the evidence
an intrinsic exclusionary principle
- it also draws strong support from its goals of encouraging witnesses to report and of pro
tecting them from unnecessary humiliation. See David P. Bryden & Roger C. Park, "Other
Crimes" Evidence in Sex Offense Cases, 78 MINN. L. REv. 529, 568 (1994).
-
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case with authors who present strong themes and a memorable
message, Damaska does not cover everything. Other hypotheses
about what will change the law of evidence are also attractive.
Damaska rationalizes procedural rules by reference to their proce
dural environment, and makes the benevolent assumption that
when their rationales definitively fail, the procedural rules will
wither away (p. 142). He may be right, bu,t along the way substan
tive influences are also likely to have an important impact. They
certainly deserve acknowledgment in telling the story of recent
changes in American evidence law.
Perhaps recent reforms that have lowered evidentiary barriers
succeeded because they encountered three crumbling pillars instead
of a solid edifice, but their immediate genesis was substantive, and
the effect of the procedural environment was indirect and specula
tive. Fear of crime and empathy for crime victims have been key
substantive influences. These influences account for changes in evi
dence law that have been adopted by popular initiative as victims'
rights measures - from the California "truth-in-evidence" amend
ments of the 1980s29 to the recent Oregon initiative calling for all
relevant evidence to be admissible against criminal defendants.30
Along with increased concern for women's rights and for female
victims of crime, these substantive influences also account for the
recent changes in the character evidence rules that allow prior sex
offenses of the defendant to be admitted31 and that exclude
29. CAL. CoNST. art. I,§ 28(d). For an account of the effect of public initiatives on evi
dence law, see Eleanor Swift, Does it Matter Who is in Charge ofEvidence Law?, 25 LoYOLA
L.A. L. REv. 649 (1992). California's 1982 victinis' rights initiative would (under a generous
interpretation) have allowed free impeachment of criminal defendants with prior convictions,
and would have considerably increased the admissibility of character evidence. The meas
ures were diluted by a combination of restrictive judicial interpretation and legislative re
trenchment See People v. Ewoldt, 867 P.2d 757 (1994); People v. Ballard, 16 Cal. Rptr. 2d
624 (App. Div. 1993).
30. See OR. CONST. art. I, § 42(f). Provisions that give the victim procedural rights such as the right to be heard at proceedings in which the defendant might be released from
custody - suggest a strengthening of the dispute-resolution, victim-satisfaction model rather
than progress towards Damaska's model of the policy-implementing state. For an account of
a proposed federal amendment that would give procedural rights to victims in criminal pro
ceedings, see Robert P. Mosteller, Victims'· Rights and the United States Constitution: An
Effort to Recast the Battle in Criminal Litigation, 85 GEO. LJ. 1691 (1997) [hereinafter
Mosteller, Victims' Rights].
31. FED. R. Evm. 413-415 were enacted as part of the Violent Crime Control and Law
Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322, § 320935, 108 Stat. 1796, 2135-37 ("Crime
Bill"). Senator Biden, the Senate Judiciary Committee Chair, had opposed Rules 413-415,
partly on the grounds that they had not been through the Judicial Conference process, and
the rules were dropped from the version of the Crime Bill that emerged from the House
Senate Conference committee. Representative Susan Molinari refused to vote for the larger
Crime Bill without those provisions and succeeded in having them reinstated. See Katharine
Q. Seelye, Negotiators Work on Details That Could Save Crime Bill, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 20,
1994, at A9; Jill Zuckman,Negotiators in House Outline Deal on Crime Bill, BOSTON GLOBE,
Aug. 21, 1994, § 2, at 1, available in LEXIS, News Library, Bglobe File; see also Clinton
Finally Gets a Crime Bill, MINNEAPOLIS STAR TRIB., Aug. 26, 1994, at lA, available in
·
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evidence about the sexual history of the complainant.32 There is
much to be said for these provisions, but it is hard to pretend that
their political genesis lay in a muted weighing of evidentiary consid
erations. In some instances, the pure and simple desire to increase
conviction rates is as strong an explanation.
The substantive influence of crime fear, which has been so pow
erful in the recent past, is possibly waning now; even the popular
media is carrying stories about the decline of crime.33 So the proce
dural pillars, strong or cracking, may for a time face only a dimin
ished assault from substantive storms. Even a pig whose house is
made of straw will have shelter a while longer if no wolf comes to
blow it away.
Though Damaska does not specifically address the impact of
popular perceptions about crime, crime victims, and women as
crime victims, a belief that these considerations influence evidence
law is broadly consistent with his framework. Substantive attempts
to aid victims or dampen crime could be seen as examples of an
activist state taking a policy-implementing perspective and hence,
because the focus on dispute resolution has been relaxed, discard
ing evidence rules rooted in an adversarial dispute-resolution
mentality. Thus, procedural reformers do not see a rape trial as an
occasion for adjusting a dispute between the rapist and the victim,
but as one in which the safety of women and their willingness to
report rape must be broadly guarded. As another example of the
triumph of the policy-implementing ideal, one could point to

LEXIS, News Library, Stribe File. The Crime Bill as enacted contained a proviso that the
effective date of Rules 413-415 would be delayed to give the Judicial Conference a chance to
respond to them. During the waiting period, the Judicial Conference issued a report oppos·
ing Rules 413-415 and recommending no change in existing law; as a second choice, it recom
mended a flexible approach that would give judges greater power to exclude sex-crime
evidence. See JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, REPORT OF THE JUDICIAL
CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES ON THE ADMISSION OF CHARACTER EVIDENCE IN
CERTAIN SEXUAL MiscoNDUCT CASES (1995), reprinted in 56 Crim. L. Rep. (ENA) No. 19,
at 2140 (Feb. 15, 1995). The American Bar Association House of Delegates also passed a
resolution opposing Rules 413-415. See Myrna S. Raeder, American Bar Association Crimi
nal Justice Section Report to the House of Delegates, reprinted in 22 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 343
(1995). Congress took no action on these recommendations and the Crime Bill version of
Rules 413-415 took effect.
32. See FED. R. Evm. 412. Substantive influences have also played a strong role in the
dispute over admissibility of expert testimony about battered women's syndrome. See
Robert P. Mosteller, Syndromes and Politics in Criminal Trials and Evidence Law, 46 DuKE
L.J. 461 (1996) [hereinafter Mosteller, Syndromes].
33. For example, see Major Crimes Drop for 6th Straight Year, Police Report, CHI. TRJn.,
Jan. 19, 1998, § 2, at 3; Rene Sanchez, Nation's Murder Rate at a Low, Other Serious Crimes
Down, WASH. PoST, Oct. 5, 1997, at A9; NBC Nightly News: Drop in Crime Rates Across
Country, Including Murder Rates, Attributed Partly to Increased Police Presence (NBC televi
sion broadcast, Dec. 30, 1997); CBS Morning News: New FBI Figures Show Decline in Crime
for the Fifth Year in a Row (CBS television broadcast, Oct. 6, 1997).
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changes in the hearsay rule that aid the prosecution of spousal
abuse cases though the victim ceases to cooperate.34
Other changes seem to be aimed at helping victims in ways that
defy an easy connection to the activist state thesis. In this category
one might include statutes giving the victim a stronger role in pro
ceedings, which could be seen as a step away from policy implemen
tation and back to party satisfaction,35 and rape shield legislation
that protects the victim from revelation of sexual history in court,
even in situations in which the evidence might be somewhat
probative.36
On the American scene, the future of evidence law will also be
affected by the increasing politicization of procedural rulemaking.
Procedural rulemaking will become less and less the province of
legal experts. Of course, the judges and lawyers will continue to
play a substantial role, both through traditional case-by-case law
making, and through expert judge-and-lawyer advisory committees.
But legislators and lobbyists will become more influential in shap
ing evidence law. Even in the arcane field of pretrial civil proce
dure, the once-prevalent model of apolitical rulemaking - under
which an expert elite, free of partisan pressures, promulgated neu
tral transubstantive rules - is in steep decline.37 In that context,
politicization has shown itself in the activities of interest groups
such as court reporters, psychologists, and of course lawyers, who
have sought to obtain procedural favors from Congress and from
the Advisory Committee.38 In the evidence context, politicians and
their constituents have long been active in the creation of extrinsic
rules of exclusion. Privileges have been a subject of state legislation
for some time, and of course interested professional groups have
had a say in their creation.39 The making of intrinsic rules, by
34. See, e.g., CAL. Evm. CODE § 1370 (West Supp. 1998) (providing for admissibility of
hearsay evidence in certain circumstances in which evidence describes infliction or threat of
physical injury to an unavailable witness).
35. Cf. Mosteller, Victims' Rights, supra note 30, at 1691.
36. See FED. R. Evm. 412; Harriett R. Galvin, Shielding Rape Victims in the State and
Federal Courts: A Proposal for the Second Decade, 70 MINN. L. REv. 763, 807, 812-13 (1986).
37. See Paul D. Carrington, Leaming from the Rule 26 Brouhaha: Our Courts Need Real
Friends, 156 F.R.D. 295 (1994); Linda S. Mullenix, Hope Over Experience: Mandatory Infor
mal Discovery and the Politics of Rulemaking, 69 N.C. L. REv. 795 (1991).
38. See Mullenix, supra note 37, at 840-57.
39. For an interesting account of the professional interest in one privilege, see Justice
Scalia's dissenting opinion in Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 18 (1996) .
Political involvement in evidence rulemaking went beyond the privilege area, however,
when, through the joint operation of zeitgeist and bad luck, the Federal Rules of Evidence
ended up in Congress. Perhaps because the Supreme Court's Advisory Committee over
reached by setting forth detailed and controversial rules about privilege (including executive
privilege in the Watergate era), Congress prevented the rules promulgated by the Court in
1973 from going into effect. See 1 WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE § 6.3 (Tillers Rev. 1983) . It then
proceeded to debate and change not only extrinsic evidence rules, but also some of the intrin
sic ones, including the details of hearsay exceptions. Ironically, Congress ultimately decided
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contrast, has traditionally been viewed as the prerogative of judges.
One would think that, especially as applied to bench trials, the set
ting of guidelines for fair inference falls in the core of the judicial
function. After all, evidence rules deal with the raw materials of
adjudicative reasoning, the database that may be used for the
factfinder's conclusions.40
But Congress and the state legislators have not left even intrin
sic rules wholly to judicial rulemaking. The most recent manifesta
tion of Congress's interest was the proposed amendment to Rule
702 in the Common Sense Legal Reforms Act41 which was intro
duced in the House as one of the of the ten bills that made up the
Republican "Contract With America."42 Part of a tort reform pack
age, it would have codified Daubert43 in a way aimed at further lim
iting the admissibility of expert testimony in civil cases.44 On the
state level, legislative interest in the details of intrinsic rules extends
from laws dealing with the admissibility of DNA evidence and of
expert testimony on battered women's syndrome45 to tailored
to dodge the privilege issues and delegate them back to the older process of case-by-case
decision. See FED. R. Evm. 501 (instructing courts to use state law and the principles of the
common law, considered "in the light of reason and experience").
40. Hence some state supreme courts have suggested that, as a matter of state constitu
tional law, the separation of powers gives the judiciary the last word on the rules of evidence,
whatever the legislature tries to provide. See, e.g., State v. Larson, 453 N.W.2d 42, 46 {Minn.
1989).
41. H.R. 10, 104th Cong. § 102 {1995). The House passed the proposed amendment to
Rule 702 as part of the Attorney Accountability Act of 1995. H.R. 988, 104th Cong. § 3
{1995). The bill was introduced in the Senate but it was never considered by that body during
the 104th Congress. In 1997, the bill was reintroduced and is currently pending in the House.
See the Alternative Dispute Resolution and Settlement Encouragement Act, H.R. 903, 105th
Cong. § 4 {1997). A similar, though more broadly worded, proposed amendment to Rule 702
was introduced in the Senate and is also currently pending consideration. See Civil Justice
Fairness Act of 1997, S. 79, 105th Cong. § 302. For an account of the proposed legislation, see
Nancy S. Farrell, Comment, Congressional Action to Amend Federal Rule of Evidence 702: A
Mischievous Attempt to Codify Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 13 J.
CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POLY. 523, 543-46 {1997).
42. See Attorney Accountability: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Courts and
Intellectual Property of the Committee on the Judiciary, 104th Cong. 15 {1995) [hereinafter
Attorney Accountability Hearings] (statement of Rep. Ramstad testifying in support of H.R.
10).
43. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 {1993).
44. Congressman Ramstad remarked to the House Judiciary Subcommittee that
H.R. 10 [Common Sense Legal Reforms Act] provides concrete steps to restore effi
ciency, accountability and fairness to our Federal civil justice system.
Our bill also . . . reforms rule 702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence so that expert
testimony is not admissible unless based on scientifically valid reasoning. What we are
trying to do here is merely codify the Daubert case to exclude junk science.
Attorney Accountability Hearings, supra note 42, at 16-17.
45. See CAL. Evw. CooE § 1107 {West 1995) (providing for the admissibility of expert
testimony on battered women's syndrome); Mosteller, Syndromes, supra note 32, at 484-91.
For examples of DNA statutes, see MINN STAT. ANN. § 634.25 (West Supp. 1998) (making
DNA analysis admissible in evidence without antecedent expert testimony that method is
trustworthy); MINN STAT. ANN. § 634.26 ("[S]tatistical population frequency evidence, based
.

.
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exceptions to the hearsay rule aimed at child abusers46 and spouse
,
abusers. 47
Perhaps faith in governance by neutral procedural experts is de
clining because of a shift in the intellectual climate. Elite rulemak
ing teams of judges and lawyers may have become victims of the
death of Progressivism, of the final triumph of legal realism, or of
postmodern skepticism about objectivity.48 At another level of in
tellectual climate, it seems likely that popular interest in improve
ment of the trial process has been fanned by the media. Cameras in
the courtroom and media attention to notorious trials have exposed
evidentiary rules and practices to public view and encouraged tele
vised debate on topics such as the admissibility of prior rape convic
tions or the wisdom of the parent-child privilege. Other aspects of
the political climate may also have made trial reform attractive to
legislators; perhaps an emergent anti-statist, anti-tax consensus has
led politicians to look harder for wrongs that can be righted without
any budgetary consequence.
,

·

Where the involvement of politicians and their constituents in
the making of evidence law will lead is unclear; it need not lead to
free proof or a more rational system. It may, however, lead away
from rules that are of special convenience to lawyers and judges,
on genetic or blood test results, is admissible to demonstrate the fraction of the population
that would have the same combination of genetic markers as was found in a specific human
biological specimen."). The Minnesota Supreme Court had a more conservative approach to
the admissibility of DNA statistical population frequency evidence than did the Minnesota
legislature, and that difference of opinion, coupled with the court's view that the separation
of powers gave the court the final word on evidence law, caused a curious constitutional
confrontation. Frustrated with the court's unwillingness to follow statutory mandates on the
admissibility of DNA testimony, legislators prepared an amendment to the Minnesota Con
stitution providing that DNA evidence was admissible. See David Shaffer, High-tech DNA
Evidence Spawns Legal Showdown, State High Court Balks on Effort to Ease Rule, ST. PAUL
PIONEER PRESs, Jan. 9, 1994, at lA. While the amendment was pending, the court capitu
lated in State v. Bloom, 516 N.W.2d 159 (Minn. 1994).
A curious California example of substantive influences on rules limiting the admission of
scientific evidence is the "Gotch Bill," which prohibits use of evidence of live animal experi
ments in product liability actions involving motor vehicles. See CAL. Evm. CoDE § 1159
(West 1995). The sponsor's aim was to stop General Motors from using live animals in crash
tests. See Ralph Frammolino, Wilson Signs Law Barring GM Animal Test Evidence, L.A.
TIMES, July 15, 1992, at B2.
46. See, e.g., CAL. Evm. CODE § 1228. For a discussion of statutory innovations, see
Robert P. Mosteller, Remaking Confrontation Clause and Hearsay Doctrine under the
Challenge of Child Sexual Abuse Prosecutions, 1993 U. !LL. L. REv. 691.
47. See CAL. Evm. CoDE § 1370 (West Supp. 1998). This provision was enacted partly in
response to the court's exclusion of hearsay evidence of threats, stalking, and physical abuse
in the OJ. Simpson case. See infra note 53 and accompanying text.
48. By the sentence in text, I mean only to suggest an intellectual climate in which faith in
professionalism, expertise, neutral principles, and objectivity may be fading. Cf. Kenneth W.
Graham, Jr., The Persistence of Progressive Proceduralism, 61 TEXAS L. REv. 929, 940-48
(1983) (book review) (attacking "progressive proceduralism" from viewpoint of trials as the
ater and political struggle rather than as effort at rational inquiry); Kenneth W. Graham, Jr.,
"There'll Always be an England": The Instrumental Ideology of Evidence, 85 MICH. L. REv.
1204, 1220-22, 1228-34 (1987) (book review) (same).
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and toward ones that favor victims, witnesses, or other participants.
One might see, for example, a reduction of the power and influence
of lawyers in a professionally dear role, that of cross-examination.
To the extent that the rulemaking influence of lawyers and judges is
reduced, rules like the hearsay rule and the ban on character evi
dence are in peril. Trial lawyers are the lovers of such rules, trea
suring their hard-won knowledge, defending their traditions, and
valuing the dominant role that the rules give them.
The joint effects of politicization and of substantive influences
could become more potent if criminal rules of evidence become un
packed from civil rules. The transubstantive nature of the rules of
evidence and the drafting role of life-tenure judges may have given
the rulemakers greater allegiance to a neutral-rationalist ideal, and
lessened their concern about the impact of the rules upon particular
constituencies.49 If the criminal and civil rules were separate codes
drafted politically, one could easily imagine different rules for ex
pert testimony in criminal and civil cases.50 Prosecutors might
lobby for a more relaxed regime for experts in criminal cases, so
that traditional forensic experts could continue to testify despite a
shaky scientific basis,51 while manufacturers might lobby for a rigor
ous regime in civil cases, to protect them from the depredations of
lawyers using "junk science" to show the ill effects of products.
CONCLUSION

The intrinsic exclusionary rules are in peril, but only partly be
cause of Damaska's three crumbling pillars. The rule against char
acter evidence is likely to be influenced as much by public attitudes
49. Cf. Paul D. Carrington, Aim of Mandatory Disclosure Was to Save Judicial
Rulemaking, lNsIDE Lmo., May 1994, at 10, 14 ("Capitol Hill is a different kind of place
from committee rooms of the U.S. Judicial Conference. One thing you can admire about the
life tenure of federal judges is that it does liberate them from a sense of obligation to constit
uencies. . . . [T]hey are not particularly interested in whose ox is being gored by a particular
rule.").
50. Such a division was attempted in H.R. 988, 104th Cong. § 3 (1995), supra note 41. See
David L. Faigman, Making the Law Safe for Science: A Proposed Rule for the Admission of
Expert Testimony, 35 WASHBURN L.J. 401, 404 n.7 (1996) ("[T]he most outrageously political
provision in the Bill [H.R. 988] is section (d), which limits the rigorous review of scientific
evidence to civil cases. Since prosecutors are the biggest consumers of science in court, it is
not difficult to see the politics behind this provision. In effect, given the values supposedly
behind this law, it allows prosecutors to use junk science, while civil litigants must demon
strate valid science.").
51. See, e.g., 2 DAVID L. FAIGMAN ET AL., MODERN ScrnNTIFic EVIDENCE 188-224 (ques
tioning the scientific basis for talker identification); id. at 79-123 (handwriting identification).
Cf. Michael J. Saks, What DNA "Fingerprinting" Can Teach the Law about the Rest of
Forensic Science, 13 CARD OZO L. REv. 361 (1991) (proposing that other forensic sciences be
subject to the same scrutiny as DNA fingerprinting). The proliferation of civil and criminal
forensic experts raises the disturbing prospect that, with the politicization in intrinsic eviden
tiary rules, these experts will seek and acquire legislative protection from assaults on the
admissibility of their expertise.
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toward crime as by any change in the three pillars, though of course
a deterioration of the pillars could weaken resistance to politically
inspired changes in the rules. The rules limiting expert testimony
are likely to be more affected by scientization than by changes in
the three pillars. The exclusionary barriers may be raised in an at
tempt to protect against "junk science" while the system readies
itself for some of the more drastic changes that are likely to occur if
real scientists become regularly involved.
That leaves the hearsay rule. One might expect that an in
creased use of unitary courts (making it harder to prevent the
factfinder from learning the content of excluded statements) and
the spreading out of trial proceedings (making it possible to give
the opponent of hearsay an opportunity to seek out the declarant or
information about the declarant) would lead to further relaxation
of the rule. But it is unclear, at least in the United States, that jury
trial is really abating,52 so we will have to await events to see
whether unitary trials will dominate. Moreover, hearsay is less vul
nerable to tinkering by reformers with substantive agendas because
it is hard to foresee which way the hearsay rule will cut - some
times it helps the prosecution, sometimes the defense, sometimes
business, sometimes the consumer. Although the hearsay ban occa
sionally attracts political attention,53 usually it is unaffected by sen
sational trials and changes in public opinion. So trial lawyers will
probably retain their influence over the shaping of the rule, and
lawyers tend to support the ban on hearsay evidence.54 It enhances
their professional role, glorifying cross-examination and increasing
the opportunity for it. At any rate, lawyers of all stripes tend to be
procedurally conservative,55 disfavoring any change in the rules of

52. See supra text accompanying notes 14-19.
53. Consider CAL. Evrn. CooE § 1370 (West Supp. 1998), inspired by the O.J. Simpson
case. The amendment, expedited legislation that became effective before the Simpson civil
trial, was partially a response to the exclusion of Nicole Simpson's diary entries in the crimi
nal trial. The Senate Rules Committee Report stated that there was a "deficiency" in hearsay
law and that the "most notable recent examples of this deficiency in California law is the
exclusion of hearsay statements made by Nie[ Joie Brown to her diary and to others, describ
ing threats and physical abuses by Orenthal Simpson." SENATE RULES CoMM., Senate Floor
Bill No. AB2068: Committee Analysis (Cal. Aug. 14, 1996) available in LEXIS, Legis Li
brary, Caco= Ftle; see also 1996 CAL. LEms. SERV. 416 (West); William Claiborne, For
Simpson Civil Tria� New Players and New Rules: Away from TV Cameras, Defendant to be
Compelled to Testify Before Santa Monica Jury, WASH. PoST, Sept. 16, 1996, at Al (discussing
application of new law on hearsay evidence to Simpson civil trial); Duke Helfand, Defense
Bid to Question Clark, Darden Rejected, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 5, 1996, at B3.
54. On lawyers as opponents of hearsay change, see Roger Park, A Subject Matter
Approach to Hearsay Refonn, 86 M1CH. L. REv. 51, 67-68 (1987).

55. Bentham put it uncharitably in his continuation of the unfavorable comparison be
tween lawyer factfinders and peasant factfinders: "The peasant wants only to be taught, the
lawyer to be untaught: an operation painful enough, even to ordinary pride, but to pride
exalted and hardened by power, altogether unendurable." 1 JEREMY BENTHAM, RATIONALE
OF JUDICIAL EVIDENCE 8 (John s. Mill ed., 1827) (emphasis in original).
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the game. The hearsay rule will be with us for a long time to come,
perhaps as long as the adversary system itself.56
In closing, I wish to add a heartfelt salute to Damaska's graceful
English. He complains about being "homeless in a borrowed
tongue" (p. x), but he writes with remarkable precision and ease.
His use of an adopted tongue may even be an advantage, adding to
the originality and freshness of his writing. He conveys a sense of
fascination with the language and what it can do. His vocabulary is
engaging and educational - I kept my dictionary at my side and
learned several new words. The reader will enjoy his metaphors
and allusions. He illustrates his points with satisfying concreteness.
But most of all, he presents his ideas clearly and effectively, telling
a story that holds together in a way that makes it hard to resist.

56. For a remarkable instance of the emergence of an elaborate hearsay rule with dozens
of exceptions in the context of agency determinations in unitary but adversarial proceedings,
see Michael H. Graham, Application of the Rules of Evidence in Administrative Agency
Formal Adversarial Adjudications: A New Approach, 1991 U. ILL. L. REv. 353 (describing
United States Department of Labor evidentiary rules for formal adversarial adjudicatory
hearings). So perhaps a relaxed hearsay rule would survive even the final demise of bifur
cated proceedings. Concededly, as Professor Graham recognizes, many administrative agen
cies follow more relaxed rules. Id. at 354-55.

